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ABSTRACT 
Artikel ini membandingkan perilaku herding antara investor institusional dengan 
investor individual menggunakan data Jepang. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa investor 
institusional melakukan herding lebih besar pada saham kecil. Artikel ini juga menemukan 
bahwa herding oleh investor institusional nampaknya tidak mempunyai efek negatif 
(destabilizing) dalam jangka pendek. Dalam jangka panjang, artikel ini menemukan 
pembalikan harga (reversal) untuk saham dimana investor institusional melakukan 
herding. Artikel ini menemukan bahwa saham yang dilepas investor institusional 
mempunyai reaksi harga yang negatif, nampaknya tindakan pelepasan tersebut didorong 
oleh motivasi yang rasional. Artikel ini juga menemukan bahwa perdagangan oleh investor 
institusional mempunyai pengaruh yang lebih besar terhadap harga; investor institusional 
nampaknya tidak melakukan perdagangan umpan balik positif (positive feedback trade). 
Saham yang mempunyai kepemilikan institusi paling stabil mempunyai kinerja yang paling 
baik. 
Keywords: herding, Japan, efficient markets. 
 
Herding behavior occurs when investors 
trading in the same direction, based on certain 
information, and probably by ignoring other 
relevant information. The phenomenon has 
been an interesting subject, and several issues 
related to this subject have been discussed, 
such as: wheter herding behavior occurs or not 
(Golec, 1997; Lakonshok et.al, 1991; 
Lakonishok et.al, 1992), the consequences of 
such behavior, that is wether it has 
destabilizing effect or not (Nofsinger and Sias, 
1998; Choe et.al, 1990; Wermer, 1998; 
DeLong et.al, 1990), what drives the behavior 
(Graham, 1998; Lakonishok et.al, 1992). 
Herding behavior may have potential in 
explaining several financial phenomena, such 
as investment recommendation, IPO price 
behavior, and earning forecast. While 
institutional investors are more susceptible to 
commit herding behavior, individual investors 
may herd for different reasons. 
 This paper investigates herding behavior 
using Japanese data
1
. We find that institutional 
investors herd at a greater extent in small 
stocks, which is consistent with the finding in 
US (Nofsinger and Sias, 1998; Wermers, 
1998). Herding by institutionals doesn’t seem 
to have destabilizing effect in the short run. 
But in the long run, stocks herded by 
institutional tend to reverse their performances. 
In the long run, stocks with the highest 
individual herding tend to perform better than 
stocks with the highest institutional herding. 
This result is in contrast with previous findings 
that stocks with the highest institutional 
herding perform better than those with the 
lowest institutional herding (Nofsinger and 
Sias, 1998). We find that herding away by 
                                                 
1  Other herding studies that use non-US data include 
Choe, Kho, and Stulz, (1998) when they investigate 
herding behavior using Korean stocks. 
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institutional investors serves as a negative 
signal, resulting in negative abnormal returns 
in post-herding years. In any case, stocks with 
the least herding by institutionals or 
individuals (that is stock with the most stable 
ownership changes) tend to perform better than 
stocks with the highest or the lowest herding 
by institutional investors. These results are 
robust to changing benchmark calculation for 
the expected return. The use of size, book 
value, and size and book value benchmark to 
calculate abnormal returns practically yields 
same conclusions.  
We find that herding by institutional 
investors is associated with positive abnormal 
return at the herding year. This suggests that 
institutional investors engage in intra-year 
positive feedback trading, that is institutional 
investors buy the winners and sell the losers. 
An alternative interpretation is that trading 
activities by institutional investors have larger 
impact on prices, that is buy action drives 
prices up, while sell action drives prices down. 
We find that stocks with the highest 
institutional investors herding have the highest 
individual herding in the-post herding year. 
Similarly, stocks with the highest individual 
herding have the highest institutional herding 
in the-post herding year, while stocks with the 
most stable ownership changes tend to have 
stable ownership changes in the-post herding 
year. Performances of stocks with the highest 
or lowest herding in post-herding year seem to 
be associated with changes in the ownership in 
post herding year. Our analysis seems to 
confirm the assertion that institutional trading 
has larger impact on stock prices than 
individual trading, rather than institutional 
investors engage in positive feedback trading. 
We still could not find the answer on why the 
most stable stocks tend to perform better in the 
long run. 
This paper is organized as follows: We 
discuss literature review in the first section, we 
present methodology and result in the second 
section and third section concludes. 
HERDING BY INDIVIDUAL AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
Individual and institutional investors may 
herd for different reasons. Individual may herd 
because of fad or fashion (Shiller, 1984, 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann, 
1990). Individual tend to be noise traders who 
are more susceptible to fad or fashion. Shleifer 
and Summers (1990) suggest that individual 
may herd by following same signals, such as 
brokerage house recommendation or 
forecasters, or place a greater emphasis on 
more recent information (overreact). Chopra 
et.al (1990), for example, conclude that 
individuals overreact. Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (1994) suggest that individual 
investors may engage in irrational positive 
feedback trading because they extrapolate past 
growth rates. Alternatively, Shefrin and 
Statman (1985) argue that individuals engage 
in negative feedback trading (buying losers, 
selling winners). 
Institutional investors may herd because of 
several reasons (Lakonishok et.al, 1992). First, 
institutionals may try to infer the quality of 
investment from each other, and it results in 
herding behavior. Second, agency problems 
between fund managers and fund sponsors 
may lead to herding behavior. Since it is 
difficult to separate ―luck‖ from ―skills‖, 
objective performance measurement is difficult 
to develop. As a result, fund managers 
typically are evaluated based on their peers. In 
that situation, the risk of deviating from group 
(in the case of falling behind) could be high. If 
the group is correct, and that particular 
manager (who deviates from the rest) is wrong, 
then the manager’s performance will look bad. 
On the other hand, if the group is wrong, and 
that particular manager follows the group, then 
his performance won’t be bad, because he is 
evaluated based on his peers. Third, 
institutional investors may react to the same 
exogenous signals, such as analyst 
recommendation or changes in dividend. These 
signals typically correlate more in reaching 
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institutional investors than in reaching 
individual investors. Fourth, another agency 
problem may also force them to herd. Trading 
based on fundamentals may take long to pay 
off, while they are evaluated in the short-time 
interval. Herding strategy could be a vehicle to 
reach short-term profits. 
Herding behavior, especially done by 
institutional investors, may destabilize stock 
prices, that is moves prices away from their 
fundamental values (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and 
Vishny, 1992). This happens because 
institutional investors trade in large amount 
and if herding occurs, then the effect of theirs 
trades will be much larger. But herding doesn’t 
necessarily always destabilize. If herding help 
move prices closer to their fundamental values, 
then herding increases market efficiency. 
Several papers conclude that herding increases 
market efficiency, rather destabilizes market 
(Wermer, 1998; Choe, Kho, and Stulz, 1998). 
An example of destabilizing herding is 
positive feedback or trend chasing (DeLong 
et.al, 1990) which is a strategy of buying 
winners and selling losers. If institutional 
investors herd by ―jump on the bandwagon‖, 
prices will pushed higher until they become 
overpriced, while for sold stocks, prices will be 
pushed lower until they become under-priced. 
This action leads to more divergence between 
actual prices and their fundamental values. 
Such positive feedback trading may also 
destabilize prices when it is used intentionally 
by rational speculators (DeLong et.al, 1990). 
Institutional investors may follow this strategy 
by intentionally and rationally move stock 
prices away from their fundamental values. 
When they buy winners, they expect that their 
action will induce follow-up traders who will 
trade tomorrow (positive feedback traders). 
This may stimulate other feedback traders, 
driving the prices up to the points where they 
are more than warranted by their fundamental 
values. At these points the rational investors 
reverse the trend by selling the stocks to the 
positive feedback traders. Several financial 
professionals, such as Soros, acknowledge 
using this strategy to make profit. Soros, for 
example, claimed that in 1960’s conglomerate 
and 1970’s Real Estate Investment Trust 
boom, instead of short selling these stocks, 
which is a short-term strategy, he bought these 
stocks in anticipation of further buying (by 
uninformed traders). This action, together with 
the same action from other ―informed traders‖, 
excites uninformed investors to buy more 
stocks, and drives the prices up. Finally 
conglomerate and REIT stocks crashed while 
informed traders already disposed of their 
holdings. 
This paper follows Nofsinger and Sias 
(1998) approach when they investigate herding 
between institutional and individual investors 
using US data
2
. We establish first that herding 
by institutional/individual investors exists by 
observing some kinds of parameter
3
. Then we 
investigate the characteristics and the 
consequences of this behavior, such as whether 
institutional investors engage in feedback 
trade, whether it has destabilizing effect, 
whether it concentrates on small stocks. 
Instead of using US data, we use Japanese data 
to investigate herding between institutional and 
individual investors. The Japanese market is an 
interesting market itself, since it is the second 
largest capital market in the world. Japanese 
market also has different trading mechanism, 
which make it interesting to test the result 
found in US market
4
. US market uses dealer 
system emphasizing market liquidity. In 
contrast, Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) uses an 
auction or order-driven system emphasizing an 
                                                 
2  This approach is different from some other papers about 
herding behavior, such as paper Lakonishok et.al. 
(1992) or Wermers (1998) which investigate whether 
herding behavior exists or not, or Graham (1998) who 
investigate what factors drive herding behavior. 
3  Specifically, we investigate changes of institutional 
ownership from year t-1 to year t to measure 
institutional herding. Then we investigate stocks with 
the highest, lowest, medium institutional ownership 
changes. The detail is explained in the next section.  
4  See Chang, McLeavy, and Rhee (1995) for this 
discussion. 
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accurate assessment of supply and demand by 
requiring all orders to interact. Unlike NYSE, 
TSE maintains daily price limits for individual 
stocks in the range of about 6.67% to 30%. 
Institutional investor at TSE is not as 
significant as that at NYSE, where large block 
trading accounted for about one-half of NYSE 
reported volume. However, institutional 
influence at TSE is increasing steadily after the 
introduction of the Nikkei Stock Average 
(NSA) and TOPIX index futures on September 
3, 1998, and the NSA and TOPIX index 
options on October 20, 1989. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We use Japan monthly return and financial 
statement data from 1975 to 1995. The data are 
provided by PACAP, The University of Rhode 
Island. We calculate institutional ownership 
percentage (InsOwn) at year t as follows: 
 Number of shares owned by 
InsOwn (t) = 
institutional investors (t) 
Total number of shares (t) 
Then we calculate changes in institutional 
ownership (InsChg) at year t as follows: 
InsChg (t) =[InsOwn (t) – InsOwn (t-1)) /  
                    InsOwn (t-1)] x 100% 
We interpret InsChg as an indication of 
herding behavior by institutional investors. 
The higher InsChg then the higher herding 
behavior by institutional investors. Since 
InsOwn is a proportion of shares owned by 
institutional investors over total shares, an 
increase in InsOwn will automatically 
decreases the proportion of shares hold by 
individual investors over total shares. Hence, 
we interpret that the lower InsChg is an 
indication of herding behavior by individual 
investors
5
. There are several cautions to the 
                                                 
5  This procedure is somewhat different from Nofsinger 
and Sias (1998). They calculate Changes of Institutional 
Ownership as Changes in stock (j) subtracted by mean 
of changes of stocks at the same period. Our 
preliminary result shows that using their procedure 
procedure presented here. Instead of herding 
by institutional investors, few institutional 
investors (one or two) may take large positions 
in certain stocks, resulting in positive 
institutional ownership changes. Another 
interpretation is that individual investors may 
herd away from the stocks while institutional 
investors do not herd. 
From 1976, we form institutional 
ownership (InsOwn) quintiles with quintile 1 
as the highest and quintile 5 as the lowest. For 
each institutional ownership quintile, we form 
institutional ownership change (InsChg) 
quintiles with quintile 1 as the highest 
institutional ownership change and quintile 5 
as the lowest institutional ownership change. 
We re-aggregate ownership changes from each 
institutional ownership quintile. Thus, we re-
aggregate InsChg quintile 1 from each 
institutional ownership (InsOwn) quintile. 
Similarly we perform similar procedure for 
InsChg quintile 2, 3, 4, and 5. Finally we have 
five groups of institutional ownership changes. 
Since stocks with larger institutional 
ownership tend to have larger institutional 
ownership changes, this procedure controls the 
level of institutional ownership in calculating 
institutional ownership changes. We repeat this 
procedure until the data reach year 1995 (the 
latest data in PACAP database).  
For each herding year, we calculate 
necessary statistics such as percentage of 
institutional Ownership for each quintile, 
changes in institutional ownership, size, and 
book to market ratio. Then we track 
performances of these stocks until three years 
after herding year. To investigate whether 
investors engage in positive or negative 
feedback trading, we also track the stocks up to 
three years before herding year. We use equal 
weighty in calculating portfolio return
6
. We 
repeat this procedure until PACAP data reach 
                                                                
gives the same conclusion as the result in this paper. We 
stick to the procedure presented here. 
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1995, which is the latest data available from 
PACAP.  
HERDING BEHAVIOR 
Table 1 presents the statistics of herding 
behavior
7
. Since our methodology is designed 
to detect institutional ownership changes while 
holding level of institutional ownership 
constant across quintiles, we have similar level 
of institutional ownership of about 67% across 
quintiles. This number is somewhat larger than 
that reported by Nofsinger and Sias (1998) for 
US data. They report the average of about 36% 
for all deciles of institutional ownership 
changes. Institutional ownership changes 
among five quintiles are significantly different, 
which is what we expect given our sampling 
design. Stocks in InsChg quintile 1 have about 
positive 12% changes, while for stocks in 
InsChg quintile 5 have about negative 6% 
changes. F-test for this variable shows that 
institutional ownership changes are 
significantly different among the five InsChg 
quintiles. 
 
 
Table 1 Statistics of Herding Behavior at Herding Year 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles. Details of the procedure 
are explained in the text. Size is the number of shares times price at the end of the year. Book 
value is calculated as book value stockholder’s equity divided by market value of the stock at the 
end of the year. We have 19 herding years and we calculate statistics for every herding year. This 
table presents the average values of these 19 herding years for every variable presented here. T 
statistics is in parentheses. It is calculated as [Mean/ (standard deviation/ square root of N)], where 
N is 19. F-test is used to test whether there are differences among institutional ownership changes 
quintiles. Statistical test is based on null hypotheses that the value is zero. *, **, and *** mean 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%.
67
 
 
 Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Q1 
(The Highest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
(The Lowest) 
F-values 
Percentage of Institutional 
Ownership Changes (%) 
11.849 *** 
(9.187) 
2.986 *** 
(6.936) 
0.612 *** 
(2.774) 
-1.144 *** 
(-6.537) 
-5.648 *** 
(-19.041) 
104.11*** 
 
Institutional Ownership 
(%) 
67.811 *** 
(49.855) 
68.357 *** 
(49.478) 
68.443 *** 
(52.687) 
68.451 *** 
(52.639) 
67.674 *** 
(52.240) 
0.08 
 
In (Book Value) 
 
-7.912 *** 
(-128.534) 
-7.788 *** 
(-111.006) 
-7.732 *** 
(-105.061) 
-7.712 *** 
(-114.444) 
-7.761 *** 
(-133.162) 
1.41 
 
In (Size) 
 
17.431 *** 
(115.559) 
17.492 *** 
(93.047) 
17.205 *** 
(85.517) 
17.130 *** 
(92.932) 
17.232 *** 
(112.079) 
0.77 
 
 
                                                 
6  Fama (1997) points out that size is an important anomaly that could explain several financial phenomena, such as long 
run underperformance of IPO or SEO. Brav and Gompers (1996), using value weighted portfolio, shows that long-term 
underperformances of IPO and SEO documented by Ritter (1991) and Spess and Affleck-Graves decrease substantially. 
However this paper find that equally and value weighted calculation yield same conclusions. We present only results 
from equally weighted calculation. 
7  Herding behavior by institutional investors and positive institutional ownership changes are used interchangeably in this 
paper. In this paper, these two terms refer to the same meaning. 
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 Institutional seems to prefer larger 
companies. The mean size of stocks in InsChg 
quintile 1 is about 37 million yen, which is 
larger than the size of the stocks in InsChg 
quintile 5. But F-test doesn’t show significant 
size difference among five institutional 
changes quintiles. Observation of Book Value 
shows that institutional investors seem to 
prefer stocks with smaller B/V ratio which can 
also be interpreted that they prefer undervalued 
stocks, but the difference for B/V ratio among 
five InsChg quintiles is not significant. The 
results in table 1 are somewhat different from 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) finding. They report 
significant differences among institutional 
ownership change deciles for size and 
institutional ownership changes, while we only 
report significant difference for institutional 
ownership changes. 
Previous papers show that herding tend to 
exist at a greater extent in small stocks 
(Nofsinger and Sias, 1998, Wermers, 1999, 
Lakonishok et.al, 1992). We want to 
investigate whether institutional investors are 
attracted to certain stock’s characteristic, that 
is size in this case
8
. While observation from 
table 1 doesn’t seem to support this assertion, 
we want to investigate this issue further. We 
provide another look at this issue by 
partitioning herding behavior based on size 
quintiles. Table 2 summarizes the result. 
 
Table 2 Herding Behavior Partitioned By Size 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles. Details of the procedure 
are explained in the text. Size is the number of shares times prices at the end of the year. We have 
19 herding years and we calculate statistics for every herding year. This table presents the average 
values of these 19 herding years for every variable presented here. All numbers are in percentages.  
 
Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Size 
Q1 
(The Highest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
(The Lowest) 
Q1 9.162 2.608 0.640 -0.916 -4.242 
Q2 10.706 2.749 0.619 -0.989 -4.833 
Q3 11.947 3.027 0.629 -1.206 -6.024 
Q4 13.039 3.250 0.582 -1.264 -6.262 
Q5 15.566 3.415 0.537 -1.273 -6.499 
 
The horizontal lines in table 2 show 
institutional ownership changes from the 
highest to the lowest, while the vertical lines 
show size from the largest to the smallest. In 
every institutional ownership changes quintile, 
there seems a monotonic increase of herding 
by institutional investors (using absolute value) 
from the smallest stocks to the largest stocks. 
For example, in InsChg quintile 1, the largest 
stocks experience institutional ownership 
changes of about 9%, and this number 
increases monotically to about 16% for InsChg 
quintile 5. In InsChg quintile 5, the largest 
stocks experience negative institutional 
ownership changes of about 4%, and this 
number decreases monotically to about 
negative 6% for the smallest stocks. 
Institutional investors seem to herd to and 
away at a greater extent in small stocks. An 
equally alternative interpretation is that 
individual investors herd away and to at 
greater extent in the smallest stocks. This 
result is consistent with the finding in US 
(Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 1999; 
Lakonishok et.al, 1992), but not with Choe 
et.al (1998) who find that herding also exists at 
greater extent in large stocks.  
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PERFORMANCE OF HERDING 
BEHAVIOR
8
 
As discussed by previous literature, herding 
may have destabilizing potential. Given 
herding behavior established in this paper, we 
want to find the effect of this behavior on 
stocks’ performances in the post-herding 
period. If herding behavior is motivated by 
irrational reason, we will expect a price 
reversal for the stock investor herd. But if 
rational reason drives the herding or if herding 
is motivated by certain information, then we 
may expect that price change is permanent. To 
investigate this issue, we follow stocks’ 
abnormal performances up to three years after 
herding year. To check the robustness of our 
conclusion, we use three different benchmarks 
to calculate abnormal return: size, book value, 
and size and book value. Size adjusted 
abnormal return is calculated by subtracting 
equally weighted mean of return of size 
quintile from associated stock return. Thus, for 
stock return in size quintile 1 at month t, we 
subtract it by return of size quintile 1 at month 
t. We calculate the size of each company and 
form quintiles at one year before herding year. 
We calculate abnormal returns until third year 
after herding years. Book value adjusted 
abnormal return is calculated in similar way. 
Size and book value adjusted return is 
calculated as follows. First we form size 
quintile using size at one year before herding 
year. For each size quintile, we form book 
value quintile using book value at one year 
before herding year. Then we aggregate book 
value quintile in each size quintile. At the end, 
we have five size and book value quintiles. 
Then we calculate equally weighted mean for 
                                                 
8  Other possible stock characteristics that may attract 
institutional investors are performance in the previous 
period (either they engage in feedback trade), book-
value, and some other characteristics such as industry. 
For example, when studying herding in mutual fund, 
Wermers (1998) finds that level of herding tends to be 
higher in growth-oriented funds. Since the level of 
uncertainty in growth stocks  -such as small or 
technology stocks- tends to be higher, this result makes 
sense. Thus industry may be a factor in driving herding 
behavior. 
stocks in each size and book value quintile at 
month t until three years after herding year.  
Table 3 presents the results. Panel A, B, 
and C present size, book-value, and size and 
book-value adjusted abnormal returns. In the 
first year after herding year, using size as the 
benchmark, stocks in InsChg quintile 1 have 
average return of 0.1% per-month, but this 
number is not significant at 10% (t-value is 
only 1.04). Stocks in InsChg quintile 5 have an 
average return of –0.2% and significantly 
different from 0 at 1%. Theses numbers 
suggest that herding by institutional investors 
seems to signal bad information, resulting in 
negative abnormal return in the first year. The 
least herded stocks (InsChg 3) have positive 
average abnormal return of about 0.18% and it 
is significantly different from 0 at 1% 
significance level. This pattern seems to 
suggest that stocks herded the least perform 
better than stocks herded either by institutional 
or individuals.  
In the second year we find that stocks in 
InsChg quintile 1 start to show negative 
abnormal returns. The average abnormal return 
of the stocks is about –0.2% and statistically 
different from 0 at 1% significance level. 
Stocks in InsChg quintile 5 show negative 
abnormal return of about 0.1% and statistically 
significant at 10% level. This number is 
smaller than that for InsChg quintile 1. The 
least herded stocks (InsChg quintile 3) still 
show average of positive abnormal return of 
about o.1% and significantly different from 0 
at 5% level. In the third year, we find that 
stocks in InsChg quintile 1 continue to 
experience negative abnormal returns of about 
0.2% and significant at 1% level. Stocks at 
InsChg quintile 5 also continue to experience 
significant negative abnormal return of about 
0.1% and significant at 5% level. This number 
is smaller than that for InsChg quintile 1. 
Stocks in quintile 3 continue to experience 
significant positive abnormal return in the third 
year after herding year. The absolute value of 
abnormal return of stocks in InsChg 1 at the 
third year is larger than that for stocks in 
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InsChg 5. Our results seem to be robust using 
different benchmarks to calculate abnormal 
returns. 
There seems a reversal pattern in the stocks 
herded most by institutional investors, while 
stocks herded most by individual –or herded 
away by institutional investors—continue to 
experience negative abnormal returns until the 
third year after herding year. This pattern 
seems to suggest that herding by institutional 
investors has a destabilizing effect in the long 
run, as evidence by a reversal in the abnormal 
return pattern in the post herding year. While 
sell action by institutional investors seems to 
help increase efficiency although the market 
seems to underreact to this signal
9
. For InsChg 
5, we still find significant abnormal returns for 
first, second, and third year post herding year. 
Our result for institutional herding in the first 
year seems to be consistent with Nofsinger and 
Sias (1998), Wermers (1998) and Choe et.al 
(1998). Our result for the second and third year 
is not consistent with them
10
. In either case, the 
strong performance for stocks in the least 
herded quintile is not consistent with any 
previous paper.  
                                                 
9  The post-herding period covered in this paper is longer 
than that of Nofsinger and Sias (1998). One of the 
concern for shorter post-herding period is that we may 
not be able to detect any reversal since the period is too 
short. We are able to find a reversal for stocks herded 
most by institutional investors, but we are unable to 
detect a reversal for stocks herded the least by 
institutional investors. It is either a permanent 
continuation or we fail to detect because of short period. 
We should be cautious with this problem, but since the 
period on this paper is longer than several studies 
(Nofsinger and Sias, 1998; Wermers, 1998) we assume 
that permanent changes indeed exist in our sample. 
10  Examination of table VI and VII of Wermers (1998) 
paper shows that stocks that mutual fund buy the most 
(heavy buying) tend to reverse in third and fourth 
quarters, while stocks mutual fund sell the most (heavy 
selling) continue to experience negative abnormal 
returns in the third and fourth quarters. But he doesn’t 
discuss this issue further. Instead he stops the discussion 
at six months after herding quarter. Our result here is 
very similar to Wermers (1998) finding, except for 
stocks in institutional ownership change quintile 3, 
where we find that these stocks tend to perform better 
than any other stocks. 
To check the robustness of our finding 
here, we calculate abnormal returns using 
Fama and French (1992) procedure with little 
adjustment. Specifically we run the following 
regression model: 
Rit - Rft = a + a1(D1) + a2(D2) + a3(D3) + 
               a4(D4) + B1(Rmt – Rft) +  
               B2(Rszt) + B3(RBVt) + eit   ...(1) 
Where  
Rit  = return of stock I at month t 
Rft  = risk free returns at month t
11
 
D1  = 1 if the stock is in InsChg quintile 2, 
otherwise D1 = 0 
D2  = 1 if the stock is in InsChg quintile 3, 
otherwise D2 = 0 
D3  = 1 if the stock is in InsChg quintile 4, 
otherwise D3 = 0 
D4  = 1 if the stock is in InsChg quintile 5, 
otherwise D4 = 0 
Rmt  = value weighted market return at 
month t 
Rszt  = return of the smallest size quintile 
minus return of the largest size 
quintile at month t 
RBVt = return of the highest book value 
quintile minus return of the lowest 
book value quintile at month t 
Eit  = random error 
 
The equation (1) above is a slight 
modification of Fama and French (1992) 
model. We introduce dummy variables to 
accommodate possible differences in abnormal 
returns among different InsChg quintiles. For 
stocks in InsChg quintile 1, the abnormal 
return is measured by a, which can be 
interpreted as Jensen alpha. For stocks in 
InsChg quintile 2, the abnormal returns are 
                                                 
11  Following Chang et.al (1995), we use one-month 
gensaki interest rate as a measure of risk-free interest 
rate. Since PACAP database doesn’t have gensaki rate 
before January 1977, we use call money rate for the 
period before January 1977. The correlation between 
gensaki and call money rate is quite high (0.97) 
suggesting replacing gensaki with call money rate 
doesn’t seem to create any problem. 
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measured by a + a1 (1). Similarly for stocks in 
InsChg 5, the abnormal returns are measured 
by a + a4 (1). Significant a1, a2, a3, or a4 
coefficients or any one of them suggest that 
abnormal returns are different among InsChg 
quintiles. Table 4 presents the result of the 
regression.
 
Table 3 Mean of Stock Abnormal Returns in Post Herding Year 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles. Details of the procedure 
are explained in the text. Size is the number of shares times price at the end of the year. Book 
value is calculated as book value stockholder’s equity divided by market value of the stock at the 
end of the year. We have 19 herding years and we calculate statistics for every herding year. This 
table presents the average values of these 19 herding years for abnormal returns. T-statistics is in 
parenthesis. It is calculated as [Mean/ (standard deviation/ square root of N)], where N is 19. F-test 
is used to test whether there are differences among institutional ownership changes quintiles. 
Statistical test is based on null hypotheses that the value is zero. *, **, and *** mean significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1%. Size, Book-Value, and Size and Size and Book-Value benchmark calculation is 
explained in the text. 
 
Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Post Herding 
Year 
Q1 
(The Highest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
(The Lowest) 
F-values 
Panel A. Size Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
year1 
 
0.001 
(1.046) 
0.001 * 
(1.383) 
0.002 *** 
(3.184) 
0.000 
(0.212) 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.025) 
4.207** 
 
year2 
 
-0.002 ** 
(-2.238) 
0.000 
(-0.889) 
0.001 ** 
(1.815) 
0.001 
(0.964) 
-0.001 * 
(-1.683) 
2.675** 
 
year3 
 
-0.002 *** 
(-3.264) 
0.001 
(0.904) 
0.001 *** 
(3.243) 
0.001 ** 
(2.019) 
-0.001 ** 
(2.062) 
4.977*** 
 
Panel B. Book-Value Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
year1 
 
0.001 
(0.634) 
0.001 
(0.934) 
0.002 *** 
(3.704) 
0.001 
(1.255) 
-0.003 *** 
(-2.810) 
4.442*** 
 
year2 
 
-0.002 *** 
(-3.420) 
0.000 
(-1.107) 
0.002 ** 
(2.293) 
0.001 * 
(1.533) 
-0.001 * 
(-1.645) 
4.969*** 
 
year3 
 
1.075 
(0.570) 
1.153 
(0.718) 
1.669 * 
(0.753) 
1.334 * 
(0.921) 
1.583 * 
(0.733) 
6.161*** 
 
Panel B. Size and Book-Value Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
year1 
 
0.000 
(0.285) 
0.001 
(0.898) 
0.003 *** 
(3.841) 
0.001 * 
(1.434) 
-0.003 *** 
(-2.865) 
4.738*** 
 
year2 
 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.703) 
0.000 
(-0.909) 
0.002 *** 
(2.228) 
0.001 * 
(1.611) 
-0.001 * 
(-1.659) 
5.373*** 
 
year3 
 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.443) 
0.000 
(0.648) 
0.002 *** 
(3.894) 
0.002 
*** 
(2.555) 
-0.001 ** 
(-1.856) 
6.527*** 
 
 
 
 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober 332 
Table 4. Stock Abnormal Returns in Post Herding Year 
(Fama and French Procedure) 
 
This table presents regression coefficients of the following model: Rit – Rft = a + a1(D1) + a2(D2) 
+ a3(D3) + a4(D4) + B1 (Rmt – Rft) + B2 (Rszt) + B3 (RBVt) + et, where subscript t refers to 
month t, subscript I refers to stock I, and all variables are defined in the text. D1=1 if the stock is 
in InsChg quintile 2, D2=1 if the stock is in InsChg quintil 3, D3=1 if thestock is in InsChg 
quintile 4, and D4=1 if the stock is in Inschg quintile 5. A, a1, a2, a3, and a4, hence measure 
abnormal returns similar to Jensen alpha. The data are pooled time-series for stock I and for month 
starting from one month to 36 months after herding year, depending on the time period in 
consideration. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Post 
Herding 
Year 
Intercept a1 a2 a3 a4 B1 B2 B3 R-sqr 
year1 
 
0.011 
(5.591)*** 
0.001 
(0.210) 
0.002 
(0.911) 
0.002 
(0.308) 
-0.001 
(-1.140) 
1.067 
(62.672)*** 
0.466 
(30.811)*** 
-0.055 
(-1.045) 
0.825 
 
year2 
 
0.004 
(2.119)** 
0.003 
(1.159) 
0.006 
(2.304)** 
0.005 
(1.962) 
0.003 
(1.056) 
1.045 
(67.669(*** 
0.476 
(33.464)*** 
0.029 
(1.100) 
0.856 
 
year3 
 
0.004 
(2.197)** 
0.003 
(1.323) 
0.005 
(2.107)** 
0.005 
(1.976)** 
0.002 
(0.884) 
1.000 
(59.349)*** 
0.478 
(32.083)*** 
0.008 
(0.286) 
0.837 
 
all year 
 
0.006 
(5.809)*** 
0.002 
(1.475) 
0.004 
(2.977)*** 
0.003 
(2.330)** 
0.001 
(0.327) 
1.040 
(109.282)*** 
0.474 
(55.328)*** 
-0.004 
(-0.276) 
0.839 
 
 
 
We run four different regressions: for the 
sample in the first, second, third after herding 
years, and for the whole three years after 
herding years. In general the result support the 
conclusion before. We find that the intercepts 
are positive significant at either 5% or 1%. We 
are more interested whether we can find 
significant coefficients for a1, a2, a3, and a4. 
In the first year, we do not find significant 
coefficients for a1, a2, a3, or a4, suggesting 
that there are not any significant differences 
for abnormal returns among different InsChg 
quintiles. The sign of a4 coefficient is 
insignificantly negative, suggesting that in the 
first year, stocks in InsChg 5 slightly 
underperform stocks in InsChg1. In the third 
year, we have positive insignificant a4 
coefficient, suggesting that stocks in InsChg 5 
slightly outperform stocks in InsChg 1. Among 
InsChg quintile, quintile 3 has the best 
performance in the post herding year. The 
coefficients of a2 are positive and significant 
in second, third, and all year regressions, 
suggesting that abnormal return for the stocks 
in this quintile is greater than those in InsChg 
quintile 1. The magnitude of the coefficients 
confirms this conclusion. In every regression, 
coefficient a2 is always equal or larger than 
any other coefficient. This result supports the 
finding in the previous section. 
To investigate whether size has any effect 
on post-herding year performances, we 
partition the sample into two categories: size 
and institutional ownership changes. Size is 
defined as stock’s market capitalization at one 
year before herding year (number of shares 
multiply by closing price of the stock at the 
end of the year before herding year). Table 4 
presents the result of this analysis using size as 
the benchmark to calculate abnormal return. 
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Table 5 Post Herding Performances Partitioned By Institutional Ownership Changes and Size 
(Size Adjusted Abnormal Return) 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles and Size quintiles. Details 
of the procedure are explained in the text. Size is the number of shares times price at the en of the 
year. Then we track performances of the stocks in each Institutional Ownership Change and Size 
quintile in the post herding year. We have 19 herding years and we calculate statistics for every 
herding year. This table presents the average values of these 19 herding years for abnormal returns. 
T-statistics is in parenthesis. It is calculated as [Mean/ (standard deviation/ square root of N)], 
where N is 19. F-test is used to test whether there are differences among institutional ownership 
changes quintiles. Statistical test is based on null hypotheses that the value is zero. *, **, and *** 
mean significant at 10%, 5%, 1%. Size, Book-Value, and Size and Size and Book-Value 
benchmark calculation is explained in the text. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
Changes Quintiles 
Size Quintiles 
1 
(The Largest) 
2 3 4 5 
(The Smallest) 
Panel A. Year 1 
1 (The Largest) 
 
0.002 
(1.103) 
0.000 
(-0.122) 
0.002 
(1.290) 
0.000 
(-0.248) 
0.002 
(0.616) 
2 
 
0.000 
(0.527) 
0.001 
(0.843) 
0.000 
(0.283) 
0.000 
(-0.172) 
0.001 
(0.692) 
3 
 
0.000 
(0.164) 
0.000 
(0.234) 
0.001 
(1.083) 
0.002 * 
(1.467) 
0.004 ** 
(2.087) 
4 
 
-0.001 
(-0.742) 
0.000 
(0.088) 
-0.001 
(-0.479) 
0.002 * 
(1.347) 
-0.001 
(0.617) 
5 (The Smallest) 
 
-0.002 * 
(-1.334) 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.325) 
-0.002 
(1.297) 
-0.003 ** 
(-1.829) 
-0.006 *** 
(-3.005) 
Panel B. Year2 
1 (The Largest) 
 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.177) 
-0.003 ** 
(-2.126) 
-0.002 * 
(1.320) 
-0.002 * 
(-1.412) 
0.001 
(0.342) 
2 
 
-0.002 *** 
(-3.249) 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.614) 
-0.001 
(-0.744) 
0.001 
(1.015) 
0.001 
(0.730) 
3 
 
-0.001 
(0.820) 
0.002 ** 
(2.286) 
0.000 
(-0.199) 
0.001 
(0.824) 
0.002 * 
(1.629) 
4 
 
0.002 * 
(1.538) 
-0.001 
(-0.819) 
0.002 * 
(1.564) 
-0.001 
(-0.584) 
0.003 ** 
(2.032) 
5 (The Smallest) 
 
-0.002 * 
(-1.570) 
-0.001 
(-0.896) 
-0.001 
(-0.652) 
-0.001 
(-0.757) 
-0.001 
(-1.195) 
Panel C. Year 3 
1 (The Largest) 
 
-0.002 * 
(-1.621) 
-0.002 ** 
(-2.102) 
-0.002 * 
(-1.627) 
-0.001 
(-0.567) 
-0.003 ** 
(-1.951) 
2 
 
-0.001 
(-0.666) 
0.001 * 
(1.650) 
0.001 
(0.766) 
0.001 
(0.448) 
0.000 
(-0.007) 
3 
 
0.000 
(0.265) 
0.001 
(1.261) 
0.004 * 
(1.632) 
0.003 ** 
(2.496) 
0.000 
(-0.391) 
4 
 
-0.001 
(-1.108) 
0.002 ** 
(1.724) 
0.004 *** 
(2.836) 
0.000 
(0.127) 
0.001 
(0.733) 
5 (The Smallest) 
 
-0.001 
(0.884) 
-0.002 ** 
(-2.523) 
-0.001 
(0.583) 
-0.003 ** 
(-2.537) 
0.001 
(0.532) 
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It is difficult to discern any pattern that 
relates to the size effect. In the first year, 
institutional ownership changes have a 
stronger effect that size. Looking at institutio-
nal changes quintiles, Q1 has better abnormal 
return compared to Q5, but Q3 has better 
performance than either Q1 or Q5. This result 
is consistent with the previous result without 
controlling size. For InsChg Q3, we find the 
size effect, that is smaller stocks earn better 
abnormal return compare to larger stocks. In 
the second and third year, the pattern becomes 
less clear. We do not find size effect for the 
least herded stocks (InsChg quintile 3). We 
still have the same pattern regarding institu-
tional ownership changes quintiles, that is the 
least herded stocks perform better than either 
Q1 or Q5. In general we do not find the size 
effect after partitioning the sample into size 
and institutional ownership changes quintiles.  
FEEDBACK TRADING BEHAVIOR 
Given the existence of herding behavior, 
we want to investigate whether institutional/ 
individual investors engage in positive or 
negative feedback trading. Investors engage in 
positive feedback trade if they buy winners and 
sell losers. Alternatively, investor may engage 
in negative feedback trade where they buy 
losers and sell winners. Positive feedback has 
destabilizing potential as explained by DeLong 
et.al (1990). From the previous section we find 
that herding by institutional investors has 
destabilizing effect in the long-term. We want 
to investigate whether feedback trade helps 
contribute the destabilizing effect of 
institutional herding. 
Table 6 presents size adjusted abnormal 
returns in pre herding period up to three years 
before herding year, including three months 
before herding year and herding year.  
Compared to institutional investors, 
individual investors seem to buy the winners at 
a greater extent that institutional investors. 
Average abnormal return in one year before 
herding year for InsChg quintile 5 is 0.3% per-
month, while for InsChg quintile 1, the number 
is 0.08%, but this number is not significantly 
different from 0 at 10%. The pattern becomes 
clearer when we investigate further into two 
and three years before herding year. For these 
two years, InsChg quintile 5 has average 
abnormal return positive and significant at 1%, 
while for InsChg quintile 1, the average 
abnormal return is significantly negative. This 
result seems to suggest that individual 
investors engage in positive feedback trading, 
while institutional investors seem to engage in 
negative feedback trading. We do not seem to 
find that institutional investors engage in 
positive feedback trade. If any, the data seem 
to show that individual engage in positive 
feedback trade. 
When we look at herding year, we have a 
very different picture. We find that there is 
positive and monotonic association between 
herding by institutional investors and abnormal 
return. From table 4 we find that InsChg 
quintile 1 has the highest positive abnormal 
return, and this number decreases as we move 
to InsChg quintile 5. The abnormal return for 
InsChg quintile 5 is –0.8% per-month, and it is 
statistically significant at 1%. This finding 
strongly supports the conclusion that institu-
tional investors engage in intrayear positive 
feedback trading, while individual investors 
engage in intrayear negative feedback trading. 
Since we have a contemporaneous association 
between institutional ownership changes and 
abnormal returns, an alternative interpretation 
is also possible. Instead of the winners attract 
institutional investors, it is possible that the 
action by institutional investors moves the 
prices. Buying action by institutional investors 
move the prices up (in InsChg quintile 1), 
while selling by institutional investors moves 
the price down (in InsChg quintile 5). In this 
interpretation, it is clear that the action by 
institutional investors has larger impact that 
the action by individual investors. The buying 
by individual investors in InsChg quintile 5 is 
not enough to counter the selling action by 
institutional investors at this quintile. It seems 
that institutional investors are the price-setters 
in all quintiles. 
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Table 6 Mean of Abnormal Returns During and at Pre-Herding Year 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles. Details of the procedure are 
explained in the text. Size is the number of shares times price at the end of the year. Book value is 
calculated as book value stockholder’s equity divided by market value of the stock at the end of the 
year. We have 19 herding years for abnormal returns. T-statistics is in parenthesis. It is calculated as 
[Mean/ (standard deviation/ square root of N)], where N is 19. F-test is used to test whether there are 
differences among institutional ownership changes quintiles. Statistical test is based on null hypotheses 
that the value is zero. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%. Size, Book-Value, and Size 
and Size and Book-Value benchmark calculation is explained in the text. 
Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Pre Herding 
Year 
Q1 
(The Highest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
(The Lowest) 
F-values 
Panel A. Size Adjusted Abnormal Returns  
Herding Year 
 
0.01398 *** 
(13.334) 
0.00459 *** 
(5.318) 
-0.00271 *** 
(-3.715) 
-0.00659 *** 
(-8.921) 
-0.00833 *** 
(-7.404) 
100.457*** 
 
3 months before 
0.00253 * 
(1.758) 
0.00065 
(0.453) 
-0.00163 
(-0.955) 
-0.00232 ** 
(-2.095) 
0.00075 
(0.370) 
1.315 
 
One Year 
Before 
0.000 
(0.378) 
-0.001 
(-0.404) 
-0.002 *** 
(2.486) 
-0.001 
(-0.804) 
0.004 *** 
(2.533) 
3.184*** 
 
Two Years 
Before 
-0.003 *** 
(-3.061) 
-0.001 
(-0.954) 
0.000 
(-0.165) 
0.000 
(0.278) 
0.005 *** 
(3.127) 
5.862*** 
 
Three Years 
Before 
-0.002*** 
(-2.451) 
-0.001** 
(-1.833) 
-0.001 
(-0.997) 
0.002 *** 
(4.391) 
0.001 
(1.235) 
4.458*** 
 
Panel B. Book-Value Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
Herding Year 
 
0.01406 *** 
(13.288) 
0.00407 *** 
(4.114) 
-0.00226 *** 
(-3.066) 
-0.00612 *** 
(-8.662) 
-0.00856 *** 
(-7.177) 
90.392*** 
 
3 months before 
0.003 ** 
(2.404) 
0.001 
(0.946) 
(-0.001) 
-0.842 
(-0.003) *** 
-2.629 
(0.000) 
0.069 
2.100* 
 
One Year 
Before 
0.001 
(0.899) 
-0.001 
(-0.708) 
-0.002 ** 
(-2.223) 
0.000 
(-0.023) 
0.003 *** 
(2.455) 
2.945*** 
 
Two Years 
Before 
-0.003 *** 
(-2.709) 
-0.001 
(-1.150) 
0.000 
(0.074) 
0.000 
(0.583) 
0.004 *** 
(3.189) 
5.025*** 
 
Three Years 
Before 
-0.002 *** 
(-2.571) 
-0.001 ** 
(-2.274) 
0.000 
(-0.600) 
0.003 *** 
(3.883) 
0.001 * 
(1.317) 
4.818*** 
 
Panel B. Size and Book-Value Adjusted Abnormal Returns 
Herding Year 
 
0.014 *** 
(13.194) 
0.004 *** 
(4.529) 
-0.002 *** 
(-2.806) 
-0.006 *** 
(-8.499) 
-0.009 *** 
(-7.796) 
97.329*** 
 
3 months before 
-0.003 ** 
2.329 
0.001 
0.963 
-0.001 
-0.759 
-0.003 ** 
-2.558 
0.000 
-0.130 
1.997* 
 
One Year 
Before 
0.001 
(1.007) 
-0.001 
(-0.668) 
-0.001 ** 
(-2.049) 
0.000 
0.074 
0.003 ** 
(2.326) 
2.556** 
 
Two Years 
Before 
-0.003 *** 
(-2.762) 
-0.001 
(-1.226) 
0.000 
(0.162) 
0.001 
(0.744) 
0.004 *** 
(3.098) 
4.840*** 
 
Three Years 
Before 
-0.002 *** 
(2.618) 
-0.001 ** 
(2.373) 
0.000 
(-0.599) 
0.003 *** 
(3.578) 
0.001 
(1.114) 
4.152*** 
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We want to investigate this issue further by 
investigating abnormal returns in three months 
before herding year. Assuming that buying or 
selling actions by institutional investors do not 
take instantly
12
, if institutional investors 
engage in positive feedback herding, then we 
expect to observe similar patterns of abnormal 
returns among InsChg quintiles – that is 
positive abnormal returns for InsChg quintile 1 
and decrease monotically to InsChg quintile 
5—for the months before herding year, while 
institutional ownership changes in the three 
months before herding year do not show 
similar patterns to the changes in the three 
months before herding year do not show 
similar patterns to the changes in herding year. 
Otherwise, if institutional herding impact 
prices, then we expect that we have a positive 
association between institutional ownership 
change and abnormal returns. The pattern 
doesn’t have to be the same as that in herding 
year, --that is monotonic positive association 
between institutional ownership changes and 
abnormal returns--. 
In table 6, for the panel of three months 
before herding year, we find that stocks in 
InsChg in quintile 1 show significant positive 
abnormal returns, but unlike those in herding 
year, the numbers do not decrease monotically 
when we move to smaller InsChg quintile. The 
lowest InsChg quintile show positive 
insignificant abnormal returns, while InsChg 
quintile 3 and 4 show negative significant 
abnormal returns. This result doesn’t seem to 
support the assertion that institutional investors 
engage in positive feedback trading. We 
investigate institutional ownership changes at 
three months before herding year, we find that 
the changes are in line with the direction of 
abnormal returns (see table 7). 
 
                                                 
12 This assumption seems to be plausible since previous 
studies indicates this possibility. For example, Chan, 
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) suggest that 
momentum effect is caused by delayed reaction to 
information in the past and earning. 
In first line of table 7 Panel B, we find that 
InsChg quintile 1 has the largest abnormal 
return and InsChg quintile 3 and 4 have the 
lowest abnormal returns. This result is 
consistent with institutional ownership changes 
found in table 6. Thus the result seems to 
support more strongly the interpretation that 
institutional ownership trading has larger 
impact on prices than individual trading, not 
the interpretation that institutional investors 
engage in positive feedback trading. We return 
to this discussion in the next section.  
DOES INSTITUTIONAL HERDING 
INVITES OFFSETTING POSITION? 
DeLong et.al (1990) explain destabilizing 
effect of positive feedback behavior. 
Institutional may rationally destabilize the 
market to make profit. In one scenario, the 
buying from informed investors excites and 
induces uninformed investors to buy the 
stocks. This action pushes the prices up, more 
than warranted by stock’s’ fundamental and 
creates a bubble. At this point, informed 
investors sell the stocks to uninformed 
investors, while stocks start to reverse to their 
original prices or crash while informed 
investors already dispose of their holdings.  
Using this reasoning, we may expect that 
herding by institutional investors (who are 
supposedly informed investors) induces 
offsetting action by individual investors (who 
are supposedly uninformed investors) at a later 
point. Buying by institutional investors leads to 
buying by individual investors in the post-
herding year. Table 7 presents the institutional 
ownership and institutional ownership changes 
in the post-herding year. Panel A provides the 
numbers for institutional changes for the first, 
second, and third year after herding year. In the 
first year after herding year, all of InsChg 
quintiles show positive institutional ownership 
changes. 
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Table 7 Institutional Ownership and Institutional Ownership Changes at Pre and 
Post-Herding Year 
From 1976 to 1995, we form institutional ownership changes quintiles. Details of the procedure 
are explained in the text. We have 19 herding years and we calculates statistics for every herding 
year. This table presents the average value of Institutional Ownership and Institutional Ownership 
Changes for these 19 herding years in the post herding year. T-statistics is in parenthesis. It is 
calculated as [Mean/ (standard deviation/ square root of N)], where N is 19. F-test is used to test 
whether there are differences among institutional ownership changes quintiles. Statistical test is 
based on null hypotheses that the value is zero. *, **, and *** mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%. Panel C provides regression coefficients for the model: InsChg ij = a + B (trend ij) + eij, where 
InsChg and trend are defined in the text.  
 
Institutional Ownership Changes Quintiles 
Period 
Q1 
(The Highest) 
Q2 Q3 Q4 
Q5 
(The Lowest) 
F-values 
Panel A. Institutional Ownership (%) 
3 months before 
 
62.7291 *** 
(37.979) 
67.2767 *** 
(45.942) 
68.7229 *** 
(52.221) 
69.8401 *** 
(54.128) 
72.093 *** 
(58.0375) 
5.244*** 
 
1 Year Post 
Herding 
68.308 *** 
(50.093) 
69.418 *** 
(52.232) 
69.367 *** 
(54.231) 
69.200 *** 
(55.803) 
68.109 *** 
(55.076) 
0.196 
 
2 Year Post 
Herding 
68.577 *** 
(54.733) 
69.875 *** 
(60.179) 
69.761 *** 
(58.536) 
69.846 *** 
(59.567) 
68.793 ** 
(62.815) 
0.228 
 
3 Year Post 
Herding 
69.173 *** 
(57.745) 
70.347 *** 
(65.372) 
70.353 *** 
(62.441) 
70.598 *** 
(65.626) 
69.178 *** 
(65.348) 
0.29 
 
Panel B. Institutional Ownership Changes (%) 
3 months before 
 
3.103 *** 
(6.012) 
2.174 *** 
(5.174) 
1.163 *** 
(3.372) 
0.862 ** 
(2.269) 
2.002 *** 
(2.944) 
2.836 ** 
 
1 Year Post 
Herding 
2.024 *** 
(5.236) 
2.146 ** 
(5.061) 
1.764 ** 
(4.303) 
1.433 * 
(3.215) 
1.151  
(1.910) 
0.677 
 
2 Year Post 
Herding 
0.900 ** 
(2.319) 
1.317 
(3.523) 
1.600 * 
(4.459) 
1.421 * 
(3.808) 
1.187 ** 
(2.809) 
0.476 
 
3 Year Post 
Herding 
1.108 
(2.451) 
1.176 
(3.276) 
1.673 * 
(4.347) 
1.312 
(3.369) 
1.560 ** 
(3.048) 
0.244 
 
Panel C. Regression Coefficients 
Coefficient 
 
-4.058 *** 
(-7.449) 
-0.809 *** 
(-4.303) 
0.287 *** 
(2.144) 
0.765 *** 
(4.821) 
2.571 *** 
(9.087) 
 
 
The magnitude of the changes for InsChg 
quintile 1 is significantly less than the number 
of changes in the herding year (from about 
12% in the herding year to about 2% in the 
first year of post-herding year). While for 
InsChg quintile 5, institutional ownership 
increase from about –6% in the herding year to 
about 1% in the first year of post-herding year. 
We observe an increasing trend of institutional 
ownership for InsChg quintile 5 and a 
decreasing trend for institutional ownership for 
InsChg quintile 1. This pattern continues until 
second year after the herding year. For InsChg 
quintile 1, this pattern reverses a little bit by 
the third year of post-herding year. While for 
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quintile 5, this pattern continues until three 
years after herding year.  
This pattern seems to indirectly support 
DeLong et.al (1990) implication. To test more 
formally whether there is an upward or 
downward trend in the post herding year, we 
run a simple regression. We introduce a new 
variable called trend with the value of 1 if it is 
herding year, 2 if it is the first year after 
herding year, 3 if it is the second year after 
herding year, and 4 if it is the third year after 
herding year. This variable is intended to 
capture the time. Then we run the following 
regression model: 
InsChgij = a + B1 (trendij) + eij             (2) 
Where 
InsChgij  = institutional ownership changes 
for stock I at year j 
Trendij  = trend for stock I at year j, the 
value is either 1, 2, 3, or 4 
eij = error term 
Since we stack up companies in the herding 
year, first, second, and third year after herding 
year, we have pooled time series data. We run 
model (2) for each of InsChg quintile and for 
each herding year. Since we have 19 herding 
year, we have 19 B1 coefficient for each 
herding year. Since we have 19 herding year, 
we have 19 B1 coefficient for each InsChg 
quintile. Then we calculate average of these 
coefficient, which is similar to Fama and 
McBeth (1973) procedure. Panel B shows 
means of regression coefficients for each of 
InsChg quintile. 
The signs of the coefficient are in the 
direction we expect. For the most herded stock, 
the coefficient is –4.06 and statistically 
significant at 1% significance level (t-value is 
–7.448). While for the least herded stocks by 
institutional investors, the coefficient is 2.57 
and statistically significant at 1% level (t-value 
is 9.087). We find monotonic shift for B1 
coefficient from the largest negative 
coefficient for InsChg quintile 1, and gradually 
increases to the largest positive coefficient for 
InsChg quintile 5. This result suggests quite 
strongly that herding by institutional 
(individual) is offset by herding by individual 
(institutional) in the post-herding period. This 
result is consistent with the implication of 
DeLong et.al (1990) positive feedback trading 
model. We should remain cautious since we 
have only three years post-herding period. 
Positive feedback trade may last more than 
three years. More importantly the test in this 
section is not a direct test for positive feedback 
trading. We want to see the implication of 
DeLong et.al (1990) model. At best, the result 
of this section may give indirect evidence to 
support the implication of positive feedback 
trading of DeLong et.al (1990). 
In previous section, table 6 for lines 
herding year, we show cross-section evidence 
of an association between institutional 
ownership changes and abnormal returns. In 
table 7, we find that stocks in InsChg 1 tend to 
have a decreasing trend of institutional 
ownership changes. These trends seem to be in 
line with abnormal returns in post herding 
year. Decreasing trend of institutional 
ownership changes for InsChg quintile 1 is 
followed by a decreasing trend of abnormal 
returns. Conversely, an increasing trend of 
institutional ownership changes for InsChg 
quintil5 is followed by an increasing trend of 
abnormal returns. This result, combined with 
the result in previous section, seems to provide 
time series evidence that institutional trading 
have greater impact on stocks’ prices, rather 
than institutional investors engage in positive 
feedback trading. Still, we could not devise a 
more direct test to determine the causation 
between institutional investor trading and 
abnormal returns. Even if we able to determine 
conclusively the direction of causation, one 
thing remains puzzling: stocks with the least 
institutional ownership changes tend to 
perform better than either stocks with the 
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highest or lowest institutional ownership 
changes
13
. 
CONCLUSION 
We investigate the characteristics and 
consequences of herding behavior using 
Japanese data. We define herding by 
institutional investors as positive changes in 
institutional ownership in certain period. We 
contrast stocks that institutional investors herd 
to and stocks that institutional investors her 
away. We find that institutional investors tend 
to herd at a greater extent in small stocks. We 
find that in the short-term, herding by 
institutional investors do not have destabilizing 
effect, while herding away (that is selling 
action) provides negative signal to the market. 
But in the long run, stocks herded by 
institutional investors tend to experience a 
reversal. While stocks herded away most by 
institutional investors tend to experience 
negative abnormal return continuation in the 
long run. It seems that herding away by 
institutional investors is motivated in a manner 
to increase market efficiency. We find that 
institutional trading tends to have greater 
impact on stock prices, and institutional 
investors do not seem to engage in positive 
feedback trade. Given greater impact of 
institutional trading on stock prices, one thing 
remains puzzling: stock with the least 
institutional herding tend to perform better 
than either stocks with the highest and the 
lowest institutional herding. We leave this 
issue for further study. 
                                                 
13  In unreported result, we investigate whether keiretsu has 
explanatory power on this issue. Japanese corporate 
governance is unique since there are two corporate 
governance systems: keiretsu and non-keiretsu. We 
partition the sample into two groups: companies with 
keiretsu association and independent companies. Then 
we repeat our analysis here. We find practically similar 
result to the one reported here. Keiretsu doesn’t seem to 
explain this puzzle. 
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